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I. INTRODUCTION
The realm of financial privacy experienced many significant
developments this year. The most publicized of those was the
revelation of the United States' use of the SWIFT database to monitor
terrorists' activities via financial transfers. Within days after the story
broke, experts in the United States called into question the validity of
this practice and whether or not it violated U.S. law. EU leaders also
expressed concern, stating that even if no U.S. laws were violated,
there still may be a problem under EU law. Throughout the
controversy, though, both the U.S. government and SWIFT have
maintained the validity of the program in all affected countries.
The Grahm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLBA") also experienced some
intriguing developments this year. First, legislation was enacted that
affects the application of the GLBA to certified public accountants
("CPA"). Second, the Mississippi Supreme Court addressed the
GLBA's application to trial discovery of financial information. Third,
whether banks will be covered under the GLBA in the future has been
questioned due to proposed regulatory schemes on that issue.
Finally, the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") has also been the
subject of some significant developments this year. The most notable
development came by way of a U.S. Supreme Court decision that
focused on specific sections of the FCRA in relation to the
requirements for showing an adverse action under the Act. Three
lower court decisions also addressed application of the FCRA. One of
these attempted to clarify the definition of legitimate business need,
while the other two helped illuminate what exactly constitutes a firm
offer of credit, "clear and conspicuous" notice to a customer, and what
constitutes a willful violation of the Act.
All of these developments, though they may be separate and
unique from one another, are of great significance to the world of
financial privacy. Each development brings with it the possibility, if
not the promise, of significant changes to how financial privacy is
approached. As such, it is vital that they all be monitored in the
coming months and years to see what the future developments will be.
II. THE SWIFT DATABASE AS A TERRORIST TRACKING TOOL
A. INTRODUCTION
On June 23, 2006, The New York Times published a story on a
post-September 11 anti-terrorism program that utilized the personal
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banking data of thousands of Americans and foreigners by way of the
SWIFT Database.1 The reaction to this information was rapid. The
U.S. government insisted that everything it did was perfectly legal and
berated The New York Times and other media outlets for reporting the
story.2 Even assuming the government proves the facial legality of the
program, the use of the SWIFT database is still problematic, as
"[t]here is a high risk that innocent citizens' sensitive financial data
was scrutinized under this program"'3 and the Treasury Department
alone monitors the use of the data, with "no outside governmental
official, such as a federal judge, review[ing] the program. ' 4  The
European Union voiced serious concerns as to whether or not the
SWIFT Company was violating any EU laws by releasing the data.
5
The answers to the questions raised by the use of the SWIFT database
have been the focus of much of the privacy world in recent months,
and is the initial focus of this paper as well.
B. THE DATABASE
The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunications ("SWIFT") is a third-party messaging service
and software company that handles international money transfers for
approximately 8,000 financial institutions, spanning 206 countries and
territories. 6  The company is incorporated under Belgian law and is
1 Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S. to Block Terror, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2006, at A10; James Risen, US Reaches Tentative Deal with Europe on Bank
Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A6.
2 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Eric Lichtblau, Cheney Assails Press on Report on Bank Data, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2006, at Al.
3 Spotlight on Surveillance June 2006: Treasury's International Finance Tracking Program of
Questionable Legality, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://www.epic.org/privacy/surveillance/
spotlight/0606/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2008).
41d.
SEurope's Privacy Commissioners Rule against SWIFT, PRIVACY INT'L, Nov. 24, 2006,
http://www.privacyintemational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]--x-347-546365.
6 SWIFT.com, About SWIFT-Company Information,
http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?item id=41322 (last visited Jan. 29, 2008). SWIFT.com,
SWIFT in Figures, http://www.swift.con/index.cfin?itemid=64389 (last visited Jan. 29,
2008). The SWIFT database is "the industry-owned co-operative supplying secure,
standardized messaging services and interface software to nearly 8,000 financial institutions in
206 countries and territories. SWIFT members include banks, broker-dealers and investment
managers. The broader SWIFT community also encompasses corporate as well as market
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governed by 7a committee of 25 independent directors elected by its
shareholders. SWIFT "routes about $6 trillion daily between banks,
brokerages, stock exchanges and other institutions. The records mostly
involve wire transfers and other methods of moving money overseas
and into and out of the United States. Most routine financial
transactions confined to this country are not in the database." 8 Due to
the highly sensitive and private nature of the information being
transferred, the SWIFT database is overseen by the central banks of
the Group of Ten countries ("G-10").9 This practice was initiated in
1998 and underwent changes in 2004 to strengthen the power of the G-
10.10 Because SWIFT is incorporated in Belgium, the National Bank
of Belgium ("NBB") is the G-10 bank most involved in the oversight
activities.1'1 The NBB carries out its duties by monitoring a variety of
official documents created by SWIFT, including reports on security
audits, incidents, and incident review, as well as papers generated by
the board. 12  SWIFT aids the NBB in this process by identifying
additional materials that may be relevant.1 3 This information is then
infrastructures in payments, securities, treasury and trade." SWIFT.com, SWIFTNet Trade
Services Utility, http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?item-id=60657 (last visited Jan. 29, 2008).
7 SWIFT.com, Governance at SWIFT, http://www.swift.com/index.cfmn?itemid=1241 (last
visited Jan. 29, 2008).
8Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 1.
9 SWIFT.com, Governance-Oversight of SWIFT, http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?item id=
57001 (last visited Jan. 29, 2008). The G-10 refers to "the group of countries that have agreed
to participate in the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB), a supplementary borrowing
arrangement that can be invoked if the IMF's resources are estimated to be below member's
needs. The GAB was established in 1962, when the governments of eight IMF members-
Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United
States-and the central banks of two others, Germany and Sweden, agreed to make resources
available to the IMF for drawings by participants, and, under certain circumstances, for
drawings by nonparticipants. The GAB was strengthened in 1964 by the association of
Switzerland, then a nonmember of the Fund, but the name of the G-10 remained the same. The
following international organizations are official observers of the activities of the G-10: The
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), European Commission, IMF, and OECD."
International Monetary Fund, Factsheet-A Guide to Committees, Groups and Clubs, Aug.
2006, http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts/ groups.htm.
10 SWIFT.com, supra note 9.
1Id
1 2 d"
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made available to the other G-10 countries, which rely on the NBB to
be their eyes and ears with regards to the monitoring activities. 14
C. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S USE OF SWIFT
Although the world did not learn of the U.S. government's use of
the SWIFT database until The New York Times leaked the story, this
controversial partnership began shortly after the terrorist attacks of
September 11.15 The government believed that tracking international
monetary transfers could provide crucial information regarding the
whereabouts of key al Qaeda members, as well as others who pose a
threat to U.S. security.
16
In order to gain access to the information, the government
established a program run by the CIA and overseen by the Treasury
Department.' 7  The Treasury Department made use of a broad
administrative subpoena, as opposed to numerous individual ones, in
order to gain access to millions of records in the SWIFT database.' 8
An administrative subpoena is "an order from a government official to
a third party, instructing the recipient to produce certain information.
Because the subpoena is issued directly by an agency official, it can be
issued as quickly as the development of an investigation requires."'19
'
4
1d
15 Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 1.
'
7 1d
17 id
18 Id
19 Tools to Fight Terrorism: Subpoena Authority and Pretrial Detention of Terrorists: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. and Homeland Sec. of the S. Judiciary Comm.,
109th Cong. (2004) (testimony of Rachel Brand, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice), available at http://kyl.senate.gov/
legis-center/subdocs/062204brand.pdf. The Republican-led Senate Intelligence Committee
pushed for changes to the administrative subpoena powers under the USA PATRIOT Act that
would have expanded the USA PATRIOT Act to allow the FBI to demand records in terror
investigations through administrative subpoenas, without a judge's order, and to have sole
discretion in deciding whether to monitor the mail of terror suspects. This part of the USA
PATRIOT Act, however, was not passed in order to allow for quick reauthorization of the Act.
See also Eric Lichtblau, Senate Makes Permanent Nearly All Provisions of Patriot Act, With a
Few Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2005, at Al1.
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The government maintains that using administrative subpoenas in
this way violates no currently operational privacy laws.20  The only
law tailored to the issue, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978
("RFPA"), is limited in scope and includes numerous exceptions.21
The RFPA was enacted in 1978 in response to the Supreme Court's
holding in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), where it held
there was no legitimate expectation of privacy for financial
information held by financial institutions. 22 The RFPA "requires that
federal government agencies provide individuals with a notice and an
opportunity to object before a bank or other specified institution can
disclose personal financial information to a federal government
agency.
'2
Further, it "provides civil remedies against the government and
banks for disclosures of a bank customer's financial information
without consent, or a valid warrant or subpoena."24 However, there
are exceptions to general protections of the RFPA. One such
exception is found under 12 U.S.C. §3414(a)(1)(A), which states that
nothing in that chapter (with some exceptions) will be applied to "the
production and disclosure of financial records pursuant to requests
from . . . a Government authority authorized to conduct foreign
counter- or foreign positive-intelligence activities for purposes of
conducting such activities. 25 Under the language of this exception,
the executive is fully within the power delegated to it by Congress in
issuing and acting upon the administrative subpoena. Further, there is
no Fourth Amendment protection for these records. The Supreme
Court held in United States v. Miller that the Fourth Amendment does
not cover financial transaction records held by third parties such as
banks, since there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in such
records.26 While the RFPA was created in response to this case
20 Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 1.
21 See Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub L. No. 95-630; 92 Stat. 3697 (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422).
22 The Right to Financial Privacy Act, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://www.epic.org/
privacy/rfpa/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2008).
23 Id.
24 David Ziemer, No Privacy Interest in Bank Records, Wis. L.J., Dec. 20, 2006,
http://www.wislawj oumal.com/archive/2006/1220/bank.html.
25 12 U.S.C. § 3414 (2007).
26 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
[Vol. 3:3
specifically, it only provides civil remedies, as opposed to an
exclusionary one that would allow information obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment to be excluded from use in trial.27
Aside from the Right to Financial Privacy Act, other statutes and
constitutional provisions are implicated. One such provision is the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA") which
"gives the President what legal experts say is wide authority to
'investigate, regulate or prohibit' foreign transactions in responding to
.an unusual and extraordinary threat."' 28  The threat posed by
September 11 falls within the language of the IEEPA and therefore,
arguably, allows the President access to the SWIFT database under the
language of the Act.29 However, there is no express language in either
statute stating that the IEEPA trumps the RFPA.
Because the government asserts that it has been acting fully within
the law in pursuing this program, the outcry from Washington against
the media's publication of this data has been fierce and swift. Vice
President Dick Cheney, at a press conference soon after the leak,
chastised the media for disclosing "vital national security programs"
and thereby making it more difficult to conduct the programs aimed at
protecting the American people. 30  Soon after The New York Times
printed the story regarding the government's use of the SWIFT
database, it reported an anticipated House Resolution that would
bolster the power of the government to track terrorism via financial
records, and put more pressure upon the media to avoid publication of
government security programs and all the relating details.31 One
member of Congress, Representative Peter T. King (R-NY), went so
far as to say that members of The New York Times responsible for the
leak ought to be imprisoned for their actions.
32
27 Ziemer, supra note 24.
28 Anita Ramasastry, The Treasury Department's Secret Monitoring of International Funds
Transfers, FINDLAW, http://technology.findlaw.com/articIes/00006/010162.htmil (last visited
Jan. 29, 2008).
29 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 110-96 (2007) (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707).
30 Stolberg & Lichtblau, supra note 2.
31 See H.R. Res. 896, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/
2006_cr/h062906.html.
32 Scott Shane, Behind Bush 's Fury, a Vow Made in 2001, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29, 2006, at A4.
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The Director of National Intelligence, John D. Negroponte, further
responded to The New York Times' leak of the information by
launching an investigation into whether providing this information to
the public has damaged the nation's counter-terrorism efforts in any
way.3 3  However, whether there will actually be any appreciable
impact on the effectiveness of the government's program is debatable,
as opined by experts on the subject of terrorist financing. 34 On one
hand, some feel that the terrorists likely knew about the government's
program before the leak and that the only persons truly caught off-
guard by the media's revelation were the bankers." If this is the case,
though, there is still some possible harm, as bankers and other
financial institutions may become more resistant to sharing their
records with the government if they know what the possible use for the36
information may be. On the other hand, some feel that the terrorists
had no inkling of the existence of the government's program and will
respond by avoiding the banking system as a means to move money.37
Under this scenario, there are two views espoused. Some feel that
having the terrorists pull out of the banking system will be very
harmful to the ability of the United States and its allies to monitor the
activities of terrorists, due to the banking system's effectiveness as a
tracking tool.38  Alternatively, some feel that nothing will change,
since they claim that terrorists likely already knew of this monitoring
prior to the publication of The New York Times article.
39
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 id.
38 Id. See also Scott Shane, Damage Study Urged on Surveillance Reports, N.Y. TIMES, June
28,2006, at A12.
39 Bryan Bender, Terrorist Funds-Tracking No Secret, Some Say, BOSTON GLOBE, June 28,
2006, at Al.
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D. REACTION FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND RESPONSE FROM SWIFT
While the use of the SWIFT database to track terrorism may not
violate any U.S. law, many in the European Union ("EU") have
asserted that SWIFT, a Belgian entity,40 violates EU law, Directive
95/46/EC, by providing the U.S. with information from its database.
4 1
The Belgium Commission on Privacy Protection found that under
Article 29 Section 1 of the Belgian Data Protection Law ("DPL"),
regarding the processing of personal data, SWIFT:
at the least committed a number of errors of judgment when
dealing with the American subpoenas . . . [which] must be
considered a serious error of judgment on the part of SWIFT
to subject a massive quantity of personal data to surveillance
in a secret and systematic manner for years without effective
grounds for justification and without independent control in
accordance with Belgian and European law.
' 2
The language of Directive 95/46/EC states that, in general, the
personal privacy of the individual and the individual's ability to
control the free flow of his or her personal information is paramount to
the interest of banks and third parties in accessing their information.43
Further, it is the duty of EU member states to protect these rights.44
Under this Directive, there must be a lawful basis for accessing
personal data. Reasons listed in the Directive that allow data to be
processed for release to third parties include: (1) it is in the public
interest to process the data based on manifested treaties; (2) the
institution or third party requesting the data has the official authority to
4 0 Belgium Privacy Commission Reviews SWIFT Violation of Data Protection Law,
BESPACIFIC, Oct. 2, 2006, http://www.bespacific.com/mt/archives/012672.html.
41 Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
justicehome/fsj/privacy/law/indexen.htm; Doug Cameron & Sarah Laitner, Fresh Drive to
Tackle Dispute on Data from Passengers, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2006, at 6.
42 Belgium Privacy Commission Reviews SWIFT Violation of Data Protection Law, supra note
40.
43 See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 41.
44Council Regulation 45/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 8) 1 (EC), available at http://europa.eu/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/1_008/1_00820010112en0001 0022.pdf.
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do so; (3) the institution processing the data bears a legal obligation to
do so; (4) the data subject has given his or her consent; (5) the data
subject is entering into a contract that mandates the release of the data;
or (6) it is necessary to process the data to protect the vital interests of
the subject.45 On the basis of the Directive, Belgium has declared that
SWIFT's actions are illegal, finding it to be a data controller, not a
processor, and therefore subject to a higher privacy standard.46
One of the main problems identified by EU privacy campaigners is
that regardless of the U.S. government's guarantees regarding its
handling of data, neither SWIFT nor the European regulators will have
the abilit to control how the data is used once the data has been
released. The EU contends that SWIFT is subject to the Directive,
even though SWIFT is not a bank or other form of financial institution,
because it is a "controller" of personal data under the language of the
Directive and therefore must comply with the Directive's rules.
48
Under the Directive:
.controller' shall mean the natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly
with others determines the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data; where the purposes and means
of processing are determined by national or Community laws
or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his
nomination may be designated by national or Community
law; and 'processor' shall mean a natural or legal person,
public authority, agency or any other body which processes
personal data on behalf of the controller.49
41 Id. at 5-6.
46 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2006: On the Processing of Personal
Data by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT),
01935/06/EN WP128 (Nov. 22, 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
justicehome/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2006/wpl28_en.pdf.
47 Michael Peel, Call to Resolve US and EU Privacy Conflict, FiN. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2006,
http://search.fl.com/fiArticle?queryText=Call+to+Resolve+US+and+EU+Privacy+Conflict&y
=6&aje--true&x=8&id=061117001041 &ct=0.
48 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 46.
49 Council Directive 95/46, ch. I, art. 2(d), (e).
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SWIFT counters the argument that it is a controller by asserting
that, regardless of the nature of the data that it handles, the company is
little more than a processor of that data and therefore it is not subject
to the same rules and regulations as the institutions whose data it
handles.5 0  This controller/processor distinction is critical because if
SWIFT is in fact the controller of the data, as opposed to a mere
processor, then it would be subject to a higher privacy standard and
would have more obligations under the Directive than processors, who
merely do what those whom they work for tell them to do, and,
therefore, be more accountable for its divulging of the data to the
U.S.51 In addition, the German government has begun to voice
concerns that potential violations of EU law might not only hurt bank
customers, but may also work against the U.S. government's goal of
battling terrorism.
If it turns out that laws were violated in the execution of the
subpoena, tensions between the U.S. and EU member states
concerning the war on terror and the privacy of EU citizens may be
seriously aggravated.53 Both the U.S. and SWIFT respond to the
allegations of illegality by maintaining that the data releases are
legitimate.54 SWIFT also argues that, regardless of whether it is
considered a data controller or a data processor under the language of
Directive 95/46/EC, there are serious interpretation issues regarding
the current data privacy law.55  According to SWIFT, Directive
95/46/EC was created in an era when the authorities focused little
50 SWIFT Statement on Compliance to European Parliament, Oct. 4, 2006, available at
http://www.swift.com/index.cfn?item-id=60670.
51 Council Directive 95/46, ch. I, art. 2(d), (e); "Opinion delivered by ICPP on August 23rd,
2006: International wire transfer by Schleswig-Holstein banks using SWIFT," Unabhingiges
Landeszentrum ffir Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein,
https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/wirtschaft/swift/060825_swiften.htm (last visited Jan.
29, 2008).
52 Mark Schieritz, Ralph Atkins & Birgit Marshall, German Concern over Transfer of Bank
Data to US., FiN. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006, available at
http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText-=-German+Concem+at+swift+Disclosure&y=6&aje=f
alse&x=9&id=060906000768&ct=0.
53 Id.
54 Id.; Stolberg & Lichtblau, supra note 2.
55 Compare the language of the Directive in 1995 to SWIFT's response. See Council Directive
95/46, ch. II; SWIFT.com, US Terrorist Financing Investigations and the Role of SWIFT, Feb.
11, 2007, http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?item-id=61228#section2.
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attention on the financial activities of terrorist organizations. But the
world has changed since 1995, and since September 11, many feel that
monitoring terrorists' finances has become a crucial tool in the War on
Terror. 56 SWIFT asserts that they have followed all applicable laws
and are doing nothing illegal, in fact they claim they are helping to
affect one of the United States' most important national security
goals-tracking the movement of terrorists by monitoring their bank
accounts.
57
Along with arguing that EU law is outdated, SWIFT also stresses
the fact that it has taken the utmost care to protect the privacy of the
people whose data is released to the U.S. government under the
administrative subpoena.58 First and foremost, SWIFT maintains that
the data searches performed by the U.S. were both controlled and
audited under the supervision of the U.S. Treasury Department which
headed the searches and was in full compliance with U.S. lawA9 This
argument is not readily accepted by the international community;
Germany, for example, maintains that legality in the eyes of U.S. law
does not determine if these searches violated German law. Also,
SWIFT identified that it has carried out similar subpoenas within the
U.S., as much of SWIFT is based within the United States. Finally,
SWIFT has defended its actions by stressing that it places a great deal
of importance upon the idea of data confidentiality.
E. CONCLUSION
Even though the United States government's use of the SWIFT
database was made known to the world in the summer of 2006, the
true repercussions of its revelation are yet to be seen. As of this
writing, the European Union has yet to decide definitively if the
SWIFT database is covered under the EU Directive, which it must do
before it can address the more important question of whether or not the
company actually violated any part of it. Nevertheless, EU lawmakers
have voiced anger at the agreement between SWIFT and the U.S. to
56 Shane, supra note 32, at A4.
57 Swift.com, supra note 55.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Council Directive 95/46, at 41.
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transfer secret banking information. 61 The ultimate repercussion for
the media is also unknown. How far will the government go to control
the flow of information to the public? Will the U.S. government
undermine the First Amendment rights of the press in the name of
protecting national security? More importantly, will leaking the
existence of the program hurt the war on terror? Some of these
questions may be answered as the situation develops over the coming
months.62
III. UPDATES TO THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT
A. INTRODUCTION
In the past year, there have been some significant changes to the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act. 63 First,
legislation was enacted that affects the application of the GLBA to
certified public accountants. Second, a recent Mississippi Supreme
Court decision addresses the application of the GLBA to trial
discovery. Finally, regulatory schemes were proposed that may affect
coverage of banks under the GLBA. While these developments are
small in number, their impact may be large, and they certainly suggest
that the GLBA may experience some changes in the near future.
B. SECTION 609 OF THE FINANCIAL REGULATORY RELIEF BILL
When the GLBA was first passed, it required certified public
accountants to send annual privacy disclosure notices to their clients.0
4
61 U.S. Mines European Bank Data, Angers EU Authorities, LAW.COM, July 6, 2006,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 152090320360.
62 To follow Europe's treatment of SWIFT, see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party,
supra note 46.
63 For a review of previous developments concerning GLBA, see Richard Joseph McMahon,
Note, Developments in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act During 2005-06: An Overview of
Important Changes in Case Law and Pending Legislation, 2 ISJLP 737 (2006).
64See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, § 503(a), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 1439 (1999)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6803 (2000 & Supp. V)). "The GLBA primarily sought to
'modernize' financial services-that is, end regulations that prevented the merger of banks,
stock brokerage companies, and insurance companies. The removal of these regulations,
however, raised significant risks that these new financial institutions would have access to an
incredible amount of personal information, with no restrictions upon its use. Prior to GLBA,
the insurance company that maintained your health records was distinct from the bank that
mortgaged your house and the stockbroker that traded your stocks. Once these companies
EXTEN2007-08]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Many felt that this requirement was not only unnecessary, but also
harmful to the accountants. The president of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA"), Barry Melancon, claimed
that the requirements of the GLBA were redundant as applied to
CPAs, that the notices did little more than confuse their clients, and
that the notices required substantial time to prepare.65 Section 609 of
the Financial Regulatory Relief Bill (S.B. 2856), which was signed
into law by President George W. Bush on October 13, 2006,
exempted CPAs from the requirements for disclosure under section
503(a) of GLBA.66
C. CAPITAL ONE SERVICES, INC. V. PAGE
In Capital One Services, Inc. v. Page,67 the Mississippi Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether a trial court's order to produce
information of third-party Capital One customers with accounts similar
to the account of respondent Page "would violate provisions in the
GLBA that protect the privacy of personal financial information.
68
Page filed suit against Capital One for failure to disclose specific terms
of a credit card account that Page opened with the company.
69
Unknown to Page, the account was subject to additional fees and
charges that led to Page owing Capital One a large amount of money.
70
During discovery, Page requested a list of all Mississippians to whom
merge, however, they would have the ability to consolidate, analyze and sell the personal
details of their customers' lives. Because of these risks, the GLBA included three simple
requirements to protect the personal data of individuals: First, banks, brokerage companies,
and insurance companies must securely store personal financial information. Second, they
must advise you of their policies on sharing of personal financial information. Third, they
must give consumers the option to opt-out of some sharing of personal financial information."
Electronic Privacy Information Center, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/glba/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2008).
65 Senate Passes Financial Regulatory Relief; Bill Expected to Earn President's Signature, 6
PRIVACY L. WATCH (BNA) No. 192 (Oct. 4,2006).
66 Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, § 609, Pub. L. No. 109-351, 120 Stat.
1966, 1983 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6803).
67 Capital One Servs., Inc. v. Page, 942 So. 2d 760 (Miss. 2006).
68 Credit Card Firm Told to Produce Data as Court Rejects Defense Based on GLB Act, 6
PRIVACY L. WATCH (BNA) No. 223 (Nov. 20, 2006).
69 Capital One Servs., Inc., 942 So. 2d at 761.
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Capital One issued similar accounts between January 1, 1999 and
April 13, 2004. 7' Capital One objected to Page's requests, but the trial
court granted Page's motion to compel, subject to a confidentiality
agreement and secific strict limitations regarding how the information
could be used. Page subsequently won at trial and Capital One
brought the case on appeal before the Mississippi Supreme Court.
73
The Mississippi Supreme Court held that, "[t]he GLBA does not
prohibit the strictly limited disclosure in discovery of the names and
addresses of other Mississippians who completed [acceptance
certificate forms] identical to that completed by Page. This
information is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. 74
The court observed that while the GLBA provides that "a financial
institution may not, directly or through any affiliate, disclose to a
nonaffiliated third party any nonpublic personal information, unless
such financial institution provides or has provided to the consumer a
notice that complies with section 6803 of this title,, 75 there is an
exception where disclosure is necessary "to comply with a properly
authorized civil, criminal, or regulatory investigation or subpoena or
summons by Federal, State, or local authorities; or to respond to
judicial process or government regulatory authorities having
jurisdiction over the financial institution for examination, compliance,
or other purposes as authorized by law.",
76
The court went on to note that it was not alone in this view of the
application of the GLBA, because the highest courts in Alabama and
West Virginia, as well as the federal district courts in Texas and West
Virginia, have adopted a similar exception by allowing discovery of
consumer information in civil cases.77 In the court's opinion, this view
is justified because "[t]he legislative history indicates that the House
71 id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
741d. at 765.
75 Id. at 762 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a)).
76 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(8)).
77 Id; see Choate v. State Farm Lloyds, No. Civ.A. 3:03-CV-21 1 I-M, 2005 WL 1109432, at
*4 (N.D. Tex. May 5, 2005); Marks v. Global Mortgage Group, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 492, 496
(S.D. W. Va. 2003); Exparte Nat'l W. Life Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 218, 226-27 (Ala. 2004);
Martino v. Barnett, 595 S.E.2d 65, 72 (W. Va. 2004).
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Bill, which added the privacy protections to the GLBA, envisaged an
independent judicial process exception," and the disclosure of
information by a part! pursuant to a court order is considered engaging
in a judicial process.
D. PRIVACY NOTICES
Significant developments have also occurred in the area of privacy
notices. Seven GLBA agencies-the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC"), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
("FRB"), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), the National Credit Union
Administration ("NCUA"), and the Office of Thrift Supervision
("OTS") in Treasury-are working to develop alternative forms of
consumer privacy notices.79  On March 21, 2007, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") and the seven GLBA agencies
("the Agencies") proposed a new rule under the GLBA what
commentators were encouraged to entitle the "Model Privacy Form" in
order to "facilitate the organization and distribution of comments
among the Agencies."80 This proposal requires financial institutions to
provide both initial and annual privacy notices to customers.81  It
includes a safe harbor model privacy form, which would be used by
institutions when providing disclosures under the privacy rules.82 The
proposed rule is being enacted pursuant to the authority in sections 503
78 Capital One Servs., Inc, 942 So. 2d at 763; see generally McMahon, supra note 63 (further
information on the GLBA, including differing interpretations of other courts).
79 Interagency Proposal for Model Privacy Form under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 72 Fed.
Reg. 14,940, 14,940 (Mar. 29, 2007), available at http://ftc.gov/os/2007/03/
CorrectedNeptuneMarsandGenericFormsfrn.pdf. For additional information, see Federal
Trade Commission, Financial Privacy Rule: Interagency Notice Research Project,
http://ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/financial_rule_inrp.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2008).
80 Interagency Proposal for Model Privacy Form under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, supra
note 79, at 14,940.
81 Id. at 14,943.
81Id. at 14,940.
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and 504 of the GLBA as amended by section 728 of the Financial
Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006.83
In August 2004, the FTC, FRB, OCC, FDIC, SEC, and NCUA
issued a Statement of Work, which described the research design these
six agencies were using in an attempt to create alternative forms of
notice for consumers.8 4 In it, they noted that the overall objective of
this project is to "design alternative privacy notices that are easier for
consumers to understand and use, relative to current privacy notices
commonly used by financial institutions., 8 5  The research was
conducted by Kleimann Communication Group and was made
available for public comment until the end of May 2007.86 In general,
the commentators supported some of the aspects of the proposal-
however, they also sought more flexibility in other aspects.81
Specifically, the major banking institutions felt the forms should be
shorter and more flexible.88 Furthermore, the bankers took issue with
an aspect of the proposal that eliminated safe harbor provisions that
allowed groups "to use existing privacy notice language for one year if
they make more than minor changes to the model language. 89
However, as of this writing, no further developments have been made
regarding the model privacy forms.
83 Id. at 14,956. For a section-by-section description of the Bill, see Independent Community
Bankers of America, Financial Services Regulatory ReliefAct of 2006, http://www.icba.org/
files/ICBASites/PDFs/2006regreliefbill.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2007).
84 Financial Privacy Rule: Interagency Notice Research Project, supra note 79; Federal Trade
Commission, Statement of Work: Form Development Project Designing Easy-to-Understand
Consumer Financial Privacy Notices [hereinafter FTC Statement of Work],
http://ftc.gov/privacy/glbact/sowprivacy_noticefinall.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2008).
85 FTC Statement of Work, supra note 84, at 1.
86 Financial Privacy Rule: Interagency Notice Research Project, supra note 79. See generally
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Comments on Proposed Rule: Interagency
Proposal for Model Privacy From Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-07/s7O9O7.shtml (last visited Jan. 29, 2008) (listing
persons who commented on the form with links to their comments).
87 Marcia Kass, Financial Groups Critique Interagency Model Privacy Form Proposal under
GLB Act, 7 PRIVACY L. WATCH (BNA) No. 104 (May 31, 2007).
88 Id.
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E. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
One final issue is whether lawyers are considered to be "service
providers" under the provisions of the GLBA. 90 If so qualified,
"[1]awyers representing GLBA-regulated financial institutions may be
required to give contractual assurances about their information security
practices and, in particular, the steps they are taking to protect any
personal information they may acquire in the course of their
representation." 91 While there is no ruling on point from the Supreme
Court, this is an issue that could directly affect the practice of lawyers
who represent financial institutions falling under the regulations of the
GLBA. Service providers are subject to safeguard rules only, and
not privacy rules, as the FTC "already requires financial institutions to
oversee their service providers by 'taking reasonable steps to select
and retain service providers that are capable of maintaining
appropriate safeguards for the customer information at issue' and
'require service providers by contract to implement and maintain such
safeguards.' 93 Furthermore, the legal profession itself already requires
a professional duty of confidentiality.94 As such, this is an area of
particular importance to the legal profession that should be watched
carefully in the future as developments in the law under the GLBA
occur.
IV. UPDATES TO THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT
A. INTRODUCTION
The Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") was enacted in order to
"insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave
responsibilities with fairness, impartiality and a respect for the
90 See Posting of Peter Mucklestone & Stuart Louie to Privacy and Security Law Blog,
http://www.privsecblog.com/archives/financial-institutions-lawyers-as-service-providers-
under-the-grammleachbliley-act.html (June 8, 2006).
91 Id
92 id.
93 id.
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consumer's right to privac ."95 The Supreme Court recently decided a
case interpreting this Act. There have also been developments in the
state and federal courts. Two issues were addressed in three cases
during the past year: using consumer credit reports to assess a patient's
ability to pay for medical services, and directing targeted marketing
campaigns at individuals based on information obtained from their
consumer credit reports.
B. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE FCRA
In June 2007, the Supreme Court decided Safeco Insurance
Company of America v. Burr.97 The issues in this case were whether
the "willful failure" language in § 1681n(a) of the FCRA covers
violations committed in reckless disregard of the notice obligation,
and, if so, whether the initial rate charges for new insurance policies
based on consumer credit reports are "adverse actions" requiring
notice under the FCRA.98 In regards to the first issue, the Supreme
Court held that the willfulness language under § 1681n(a) of the Act
applies to reckless disregard of a statutory duty, not just knowing
violations of the Act, as the petitioners argued.99
Turning to the second issue, the Court held that "the 'increase' [in
the rate] required for 'adverse action,' 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i),
speaks to a disadvantageous rate even with no prior dealing," and
therefore "the term reaches initial rates for new applicants."' 00
However, the Court then looked to § 168 1m(a), which "calls for notice
only when the adverse action is 'based in whole or in part on' a credit
report. ' 1° 1 Here the Court held that "the phrase 'based on' indicates a
but-for causal relationship and thus a necessary logical condition.
Under this most natural reading of § 1681 m(a), then, an increased rate
" 15 U.S.C. § 168 1(a)(4) (2000 & Supp. V), available at
http://uscode.house.gov/pdf/200/2005usc 15.pdf.
96 Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007).
97 id.
" Id. at 2205, 2210.
99 Id. at 2208-10.
I°Id. at 2212.
1 Id.
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is not 'based in whole or in part on' the credit report unless the report
was a necessary condition of the increase. ' 10 2 Since notice is not
explicitly required for adverse action from merely consulting a report,
the Court reasoned that conditioning the requirement on action "based
on" a report suggests the duty comes from an actual consequence of
reading the report, not just an event that would have happened
anyway."1
03
The Court then determined the benchmark for whether setting a
high first-time rate constitutes a disadvantageous increase, and would
thus be an adverse action requiring notice. It held that the baseline rate
should be the rate that "the applicant would have had if the company
had not taken his credit score into account." 10 4  In reaching its
conclusion, the Court determined that Congress was "more likely
concerned with the practical question whether the consumer's rate
actually suffered when the company took his credit report into account
than the theoretical question whether the consumer would have gotten
a better rate with perfect credit."'1 5 The Court then addressed the issue
of whether a customer needs to be provided notice when the initial rate
offered, if considered an increase, is consistently and repeatedly
offered to the client at the beginning of each new dealing.1 6 The
Court held that such repeat notices were unnecessary, noting that:
[o]nce a consumer has learned that his credit report led the
insurer to charge more, he has no need to be told over again
with each renewal if his rate has not changed. For that
matter, any other construction would probably stretch the
word 'increase' more than it could bear.... Once buyer and
seller have begun a course of dealing, customary usage does
demand a change for 'increase' to make sense. Thus, after
initial dealing between the consumer and the insurer, the
12id.
103 id.
'04Id at 2213.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 2214.
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baseline for 'increase' is the previous rate or charge, not the
'neutral' baseline that applies at the start. 10 7
In the consolidated action of GEICO General Insurance Company
v. Edo, the Supreme Court found that since the initial rate offered to
Edo was the same it would have been had Edo's credit score not been
taken into account, there was no need for GEICO to provide Edo with
adverse action notice under § 1681m(a).108  In Safeco, Safeco was
found to have violated the FCRA by not providing adverse action
notification when it used consumer credit reports to determine the
initial application rate of Burr. 10 9 However, to be liable Burr had to
establish that Safeco had acted recklessly in its violation.1 0° Since the
Court found that Safeco's mistake in application of the term "increase"
in the Act was not unreasonable, Safeco did not act recklessly by not
providing adverse action notification and, therefore, was not liable."'
C. THE LEGITIMACY OF USING CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS
TO ASSESS ABILITY TO PAY
On June 22, 2006, the District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama decided Wallace v. Finkel.112 The issue in that case was
whether respondent Finkel obtained petitioner Wallace's credit report
for a permissible purpose under the FCRA. 113 The court ruled that
respondent's use of a consumer credit report, without consent of the
consumer, to assess the consumer's ability to pay for medical services
did not violate the FCRA. 114
The plaintiff claims that the purpose was improper because she did
not intend to enter into a "credit transaction" with the defendant (i.e.
107 id.
log Id.
...1d. at 2215.
11OlM
"
111 Id.
112 Wallace v. Finkel, No. 2:06CV05-SRW, 2006 WL 1731149 (M.D. Ala. 2006).
13 Id. at *2.
114 I, at *1.
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did not initiate the transaction). Therefore, she argued, he had no
legitimate purpose to assess her ability to pay. The court found that,
although she did not intend to enter a "credit transaction", the plaintiff
did initiate the overall transaction which was sufficient to meet that
portion of the statute's requirements. 1
5
The court had identified the release of the information to
individuals who have "a legitimate business need for the information
. . . in connection with a business transaction that is initiated by the
consumer" as a permissible purpose under the FCRA."I 6 Based on the
principles of statutory interpretation, the court found that regardless of
what the statute may say elsewhere, the "business need" as applied to
the case at hand covered the respondent's circumstances based on
previous FTC construction of the statute.117 Accordingly, without any
other evidence presented against the defendant, the court found no
indication that the defendant accessed the consumer credit report for
anythingo other than a legitimate business need covered under the
FCRA.
D. TARGETED MARKETING CAMPAIGNS AND THE FCRA:
MURRAY V. SUNRISE CHEVROLET, INC.
On July 31, 2006, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois decided Murray v. Sunrise Chevrolet, Inc. 119 The
main issue in Murray was whether a notice of pre-approval constituted
a firrn offer of credit, creating a permissible purpose for respondent to
access petitioner's credit report without written consent. 20 The court
held that the respondent did in fact violate the FCRA when, during the
course of a targeted marketing campaign, it both failed to get
permission of consumers in Illinois and failed to extend them a firm
115 id.
16Id. at *3 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(F)(i)).
117 Id. at *4.
M' Id. at C5-6.
119 Murray v. Sunrise Chevrolet, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 2d 940 (N.D. 111. 2006).
121 Id. at 941-42.
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offer of credit when it accessed their credit records. 12 1 The second
issue presented was whether the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions
Act of 2003 ("FACT Act") prevented petitioner from bringing a
private action against respondent. 122 The court held that the FACT Act
does not apply retroactively, and the activities in the surrounding cause
of action occurred prior to the enactment of the section of the FACT
Act that would prevent petitioner's action. 1
23
The court held that this action was covered under the FCRA, which
mandates that access of a consumer credit report is allowed only with
written consent of the consumer or for a permissible purpose, one such
purpose being to make a firm offer of credit to the consumer. 124 This
firm offer of credit is defined by the court as being, "any offer of credit
... to a consumer that will be honored if the consumer is determined,
based on information in a consumer report on the consumer, to meet
the specific criteria used to select the consumer for the offer."' 125 The
offer that was extended by the defendant was not a firm offer,
according to the court, because it was not an actual guarantee that the
plaintiff would be granted the loan amount. 126
The next issue examined by the court was whether the respondent
provided a "clear and conspicuous notice" to the plaintiff of the right
to prohibit the use of their credit report for such purposes as an auto
loan solicitation under of FCRA. 127 The court found that respondent
had not, holding that in order to comply with the clear and
conspicuous requirements under the FCRA,
The creditor must disclose that 1) it used information from
the consumer's credit report in connection with the offer; 2)
121 Id. at 950; For additional information, see Donald G. Aplin, Court: Willful Violation
Allegations are Viable in FCRA Class Claim over Car Dealer Mailings, 5 PRIVACY & SEC. L.
REP. (BNA) No. 33, at 1141 (Aug. 14, 2006).
122 Murray, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 945.
123 Id.
124 id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(c)(1)(B)(i)). See also FTC, THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING
ACT, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcradoc.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2008)
(discussion on permissible purposes).
125 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(1)).
121 Id. at 947.
127 id.
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the consumer received the offer because she satisfied the
creditor's criteria for credit worthiness; 3) failure to meet the
section criteria or any applicable criteria bearing on credit
worthiness may cause the creditor to rescind the offer; 4) the
consumer has a right to prohibit her credit report from being
used in connection with any credit transaction that she does
not initiate; and 5) she may exercise her right to "opt out" of
such credit transactions by contacting a specified toll-free
number or by sending a written request to the credit agency
at a given address.
128
However, just because a creditor includes all these points on the
document sent out to the consumer does not automatically guarantee
that the document meets the clear and conspicuous test, as notice of
the above information must be resented in a way that actively draws
the attention of the consumer. Because the defendant's pre-approval
notice did not do this, the court held that it failed the clear and
conspicuous test. 
130
The court also addressed the issue of whether it was possible for
the plaintiff to establish that the defendant willfully violated the FCRA
requirements, against the assertions of the defendant.' 3 ' In order to
show a willful violation, the court held that "Murray must be able to
demonstrate that Triad and Sunrise 'knowingly and intentionally'
violated the statute and in so doing, were 'conscious' that their acts
'impinge[d] on the rights of others.""' 1 32  However, due to the
unavailability of information on the issue, for the purposes of
summaryjudgment, the court declined to decide if the defendant acted
willfully. 
3
121 Id. at 947-48 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(d)(1)).
129 Id. at 948.
130 id.
131 Id. at 949.
132Id. (citation omitted).
'Id at 950.
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E. TARGETED MARKETING CAMPAIGNS AND THE FCRA:
MURRA Y v. NEW CINGULAR WIRELESS SER VICES, INC.
On May 22, 2006, the U.S. District Court of the Northern District
of Illinois decided another targeted marketing campaign case, Murray
v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Incorporated.r34  The issues
presented were whether the defendant presented a firm offer and
whether the defendant made a clear and conspicuous disclosure of the
consumer's rights. 135 The court held that the defendant had indeed
made a firm offer of credit as defined under the FCRA and was
therefore not in violation of the Act when it accessed individual credit
reports without first gaining permission from the individuals. 136 The
court went on to find that while the defendant failed to meet the clear
and conspicuous requirement under the FCRA, because the plaintiff
could not show that Cingular willfully violated the FCRA, summary
judgment was granted. 137
The court reached the decision concerning whether the offer was a
firm offer of credit by looking at all the circumstances surrounding the
offer. It stated "[i]n making this determination, we must consider the
amount of credit extended; whether the offer has value; whether
approval was guaranteed; and the other terms of the offer, such as the
rate of interest charged, the method of computing interest and the
length of the repayment period."'138  When analyzing these
circumstances, the court found that there was a firm offer because "the
pre-approval for the new phone is tied to activation on a qualifying
Cingular monthly wireless plan and is not simply pre-approval for a
free wireless phone only."139 Further supporting the holding was the
fact that "consumers who sign up for a wireless phone plan are
extended credit because they pay for service at the end of the month
rather than buying the minutes in advance."' 140 This characterization is
114 432 F. Supp. 2d 788 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
135 New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 790.
13 61 d. at 792.
137/Id. at 793-94; see also, Court Throws Out Consumer Class FCRA Suit over Wireless Offer
Based on Credit Reports, 5 PRIVACY & SEC. L. REP. (BNA) 24, at 835 (June 12, 2006).
138 New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 791.
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within the definition of credit found under section 1691a(d) of the
FCRA, which states that credit is "the right... to purchase property or
services and defer payment therefore."' 1 The court also supports its
holding by stating that there is no indication that the offer is lacking a
guarantee to be honored if the consumer decides to accept the offer,
nor must there be an interest rate for the offer to be considered valid
under the FCRA as a firm offer.'42
However, the court did not find that the defendant likely complied
with the clear and conspicuous requirement under the FCRA.'43 In the
mailing sent out to the plaintiff, the only indication of the necessary
disclosures was the term "DISCLOSURE" in capital letters. 144 This
was found to be insufficient because, along with all other information
included in the mailing, it was in extremely small font and therefore
unlikely to draw the reader's attention.145 This was not found to be
fatal to the defendant's case, though, for while the court found that the
disclosures likely failed the clear and conspicuous requirements, the
court pointed out no case has -et definitively determined the meaning
of "clear and conspicuous. Therefore, since the defendant was
found to have made a firm offer and the plaintiff was unable to show a
willful violation of the FCRA, the court ruled that the plaintiff's case
must fail and ruled for the defendant on its motion for summary
judgment. 147
F. CONCLUSION
While Safeco Insurance Company of America v. Burr and GEICO
General Insurance Company v. Edo are the only two cases that present
binding case law in the area of the FCRA, the other cases are not
insignificant. How the Supreme Court handles the decisions of the
lower courts in these cases could have a great affect on the future
141 Id.
142 Id. at 792.
143 Id. at 793.
144id
145 id.
141 Id. at 794.
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interpretation of the FCRA. As such, it will be imperative to monitor
these cases and cases that cite them to see how the Supreme Court
rules on the interpretations these cases propose.
V. CONCLUSION
The revelation of the U.S. government's use of the SWIFT
database to track the financial transfers of terrorist organizations is one
of the most important developments in financial privacy law this year.
Its implications are monumental, not only for the continuing success of
the U.S. in fighting terrorism, but also for EU privacy law and the U.S.
freedom of the press. Although the information was released in June
2006, the issue is far from fading. Much is yet to be seen regarding
how the EU will respond to SWIFT's compliance with the U.S.
subpoena and whether the U.S. Congress will restrict the free speech
of the American press. As such, this issue should be watched
vigilantly in the coming months.
While much of the media focused mainly on the SWIFT leak and
subsequent developments, it was not the only important development
in the area of financial privacy this year. The Grahm-Leach-Bliley Act
was also an area of significant development. The amendments to
GLBA via section 609 of the Financial Regulatory Relief Bill signed
into law October 13, 2006, will reduce CPAs federally mandated
workload. Additionally, the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision in
Capital One Services, Inc. v. Page presents the issue of what exactly
are the exceptions to the nondisclosure rule of the GLBA, an issue that
has yet to be addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Finally, the issues
of whether lawyers are service providers and proposed changes in
privacy notices are both being addressed by professionals in the
financial privacy realm. We should expect major changes in the future
regarding these issues.
Significant developments regarding the Fair Credit Reporting Act
also deserve attention. The Supreme Court's holdings in Safeco
Insurance Company of America v. Burr and GEICO General
Insurance Company v. Edo provide additional interpretation of the
provisions of the FCRA regarding what is required for a finding of an
"adverse action," which is needed to bring suit under the FCRA. In
addition, the district courts tackled several aspects of FCRA,
including what is viewed as a legitimate business need, what is
considered a firm offer of credit, what counts as "clear and
conspicuous notice," what constitutes a "firm offer," and what is a
willful violation of the FCRA. However, none of the district court
cases are binding. We must await future Supreme Court decisions
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before these and other issues of financial privacy law in the United
States are clear. These developments concerning FCRA, however, as
well as the ones concerning GLBA and the SWIFT database,
demonstrate just how turbulent a year it has been in the world of
financial privacy.
